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Abstract. In this paper, we propose an FPGA cluster infrastructure, which can
be utilized in implementing cryptanalytic attacks and accelerating cryptographic
operations. The cluster can be formed using simple and inexpensive, off-the-shelf
FPGA boards featuring an FPGA device, local storage, CPLD, and network con-
nection. Forming the cluster is simple and no effort for the hardware development
is needed except for the hardware design for the actual computation. Using a soft-
core processor on FPGA, we are able to configure FPGA devices dynamically and
change their configuration on the fly from a remote computer. The softcore on
FPGA can execute relatively complicated programs for mundane tasks unwor-
thy of FPGA resources. Finally, we propose and implement a fast and efficient
dynamic configuration switch technique that is shown to be useful especially in
cryptanalytic applications. Our infrastructure provides a cost-effective alternative
for formerly proposed cryptanalytic engines based on FPGA devices.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic operations usually contain high degree of parallelism, which favors repet-
itive instantiation of the same basic block for the cryptographic primitives. Thus, hardware-
based cryptographic accelerators, harnessing the aforementioned parallelism, have be-
come the focus of both industrial and academical interests in the last two decades.
Cryptanalytic studies aim to discover the strength of cryptographic algorithms against
certain attack techniques, efficiency of which is determined by, to a large extent, amount
of computational power available at affordable costs. As it is possible to make rela-
tively accurate predictions (at least so far) for the increase in computational power and
decrease in their associate costs in future (e.g. Moore’s Law), we can provide some
predictions for the future strength of certain cryptographic algorithms and their key
lengths. Moreover, since increase in raw computational power does not necessarily lead
to the same level of increase in our capacity for breaking ciphers, it is important to work
on new architectures that will make an efficient use of the new computing capabilities.
Recent developments in FPGA technology, in terms of increased resources and de-
clining costs, emphasize the configurable logic devices as the economic alternative for
both cryptographic acceleration and cryptanalytic computations. Grasping this great po-
tential, previous works in literature propose FPGA-based designs and architectures for
both cryptographic acceleration [1, 2] and cryptanalytic purposes [3, 4, 5].
Nowadays, many FPGAs can be configured to implement microprocessor cores that
can handle mundane tasks, which are not performance bound and unworthy of valuable
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FPGA resources (e.g. TCP/IP communication). MicroBlaze, which is a soft processor
core (softcore henceforth) by Xilinx and can be implemented even on inexpensive FP-
GAs using the reconfigurable logic of FPGAs [6], can be utilized in this context.
In addition, FPGAs can be dynamically configured to implement multiple hardware
designs. Relatively fast dynamical switching between configurations provides agility as
well as flexibility to meet computational diversity of cryptologic applications. More-
over, the configuration files for multiple designs can be sent over a network.
This work uses Spartan-3E Starter Kit to form a so-called FPGA cluster for cryp-
tologic purposes. Our approach differs from similar and the closest works in [3, 4, 5]
in the sense that a super computer does from a server cluster. Our FPGA cluster can be
formed using a host-PC acting as the cluster head and any off-the-shelf FPGA board
featuring an FPGA, a network interface, local storage, and a simple CPLD.
The proposed cluster can be efficiently used for cryptanalytic purposes (e.g. ex-
haustive search). For certain cases, it can also be used as an accelerator to speedup the
cryptographic applications. By supporting a fast, dynamic configuration switch, each
FPGA board can combine the versatility of general-purpose computer with the parallel
computing capability of hardware designs, even for FPGAs in the low-end of the cost
spectrum. The software components we develop and denote as proxies running both in
the cluster head and the softcore enables a transparent programing experience similar
to the one provided by middleware for parallel programing and remote procedure call.
Outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the architecture of
the proposed FPGA cluster, employed FPGA boards and its components. We explain
operational steps adopted for FPGA device and dynamic configuration switch technique
in Section 3. Section 4 provides the details of the usage of the proposed cluster for
cryptographic acceleration and cryptanalysis. Implementation details and experimental
results are provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Proposed Architecture for FPGA cluster
The architectural overview of the FPGA cluster we use in our work is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. Since our architecture uses TCP/IP for communication, any FPGA board con-
nected to the Internet can be a part of our cluster and individually accessed from any-
where in the network.
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Fig. 1. General overview of the FPGA cluster
As pointed out earlier, our goal is to harness especially the computation power of
inexpensive FPGA boards for the use in cryptologic applications. Therefore, we use
Spartan-3E Starter Kit board, which is one of the basic equipment used in logic design
courses. A Spartan-3E Starter Kit [7] is a board that consists of the following hardware
components: i) volatile programmable unit (FPGA - XC3S500E), ii) a nonvolatile pro-
grammable unit (CPLD - XC2C64A), iii) 128 Mbit parallel flash memory, iv) 64 MB
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DDR SDRAM (MT46V32M16), v) Standard Microsystems LAN83C185 10/100 Eth-
ernet physical layer (PHY) interface and vi) a RJ-45 connector. In Figure 2, we show
how we utilize those components in our cluster.
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Fig. 2. Components of the FPGA board
For flexibity and transparency purposes, the proposed infrastructure is designed as a
self-configuring system, which becomes ready for remote configuration once it is con-
nected to the Internet. In addition, runtime reconfigurability allows to switch between
16 different configurations, which is controlled by the CPLD, dynamically.
3 Our Scheme and Its Operational Steps
Our scheme can be understood better if the following four key steps of its operation are
explained in detail as follows:
Softcore Configuration: A state machine implemented in the non-volatile CPLD
configures FPGA automatically using the configuration bit stream of the softcore stored
in the parallel flash, when the device is turned on. Following the softcore configuration,
a special program called boot-loader is executed by the softcore.
Execution of Boot-loader: The boot-loader is a small piece of code, which comes
as a part of configuration file of the softcore and stored in internal Block RAM (BRAM)
of the FPGA. It is responsible of moving the proxy code1 from the parallel flash to the
SDRAM since the latter is too large to fit in the internal BRAM.
Execution of Proxy for Implementing Client/Server Communication Model:
To assign tasks, the cluster head communicates with FPGA boards using reliable TCP/IP
protocols which are implemented by the proxy code on the softcore side. In our com-
munication model, the cluster head and the softcore plays the roles of server and clients
interchangeably.
Automatic, Remote Configuration of FPGA Device and Configuration Switch:
The actual computations for specific tasks are performed by hardware implementations,
optimized for the FPGA devices. Once the configuration file for a hardware implemen-
tation is available, the cluster head can send it through network to the FPGA devices.
The proxy code running on the softcore is responsible of receiving the hardware con-
figuration file and storing it in the parallel flash.
The configuration switch necessitates the execution of the following steps in this
order: i) Communication 1: Input data is sent to the softcore and stored in parallel
1 The code of the main software application which is used to communicate with the cluster head.
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flash, ii) Configuration switch 1: Softcore removes itself from the FPGA and loads the
hardware, iii) Computation: The hardware works on the task, and writes the results
in the parallel flash, iv) Configuration switch 2: The hardware is removed and the
softcore is loaded in the FPGA, v) Communication 2: The softcore reads the results
from the parallel flash, and sends them to the cluster head.
Alternatively, especially for applications and FPGAs where the area overhead of the
softcore is not important, the hardware design and the softcore can run simultaneously
in FPGAs, which eliminates the need for configuration switch as described above. In
subsequent sections, we give applications that benefit from the configuration switch.
4 Using FPGA Cluster for Acceleration of Cryptographic
Computations and Cryptanalysis
A simple and inexpensive FPGA device such as Spartan-3 running at a low clock fre-
quency of 119 MHz can perform an RSA exponentiation operation in about 8 ms using
1553 slices and 10 hardwired multipliers [1]2. Similarly, the same FPGA device can
achieve an encryption rate of 429 Mbps for the AES standard block cipher algorithm
using only 103 slices at 161 MHz [8]. Since the FPGA device can realize more than one
block of AES encryption engine, it is possible to reach much higher throughput values
for encryption operation either using multi-message encryption techniques or a suitable
working mode (e.g. counter mode). Therefore, using simple, inexpensive FPGA clusters
can be cost-effective alternatives for accelerating cryptographic operations. However,
cryptographic acceleration through a simple FPGA board may not be feasible if config-
uration switching is needed3. In Section 5, we provide a scenario where cryptographic
acceleration may be possible even in the case of configuration switch. But, block ci-
pher acceleration is always possible since the FPGA device can be shared between the
softcore and the hardware.
Most cryptanalytic algorithms can be adjusted to alleviate the time overhead in-
curred in inter-process communication between the cluster head and the FPGA boards.
Both designs in [4] for exhaustive key search and [5] for solving discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) rely on a massively parallel computer of inexpensive FPGA devices as
the computational work horse. Also, as stated in [5], certain computations in the Pol-
lard’s Rho method [9, 10] for solving elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP) can be so adjusted
to meet any bandwidth restriction between the cluster head and the FPGA boards.
For instance, in an exhaustive search for a AES key using the implementation in
[8], one AES block (103 slices) can try approximately 3.3 million key candidates in
one second. In a single computation task submitted to an FPGA, which takes about
one minute, one additional AES block implemented on the FPGA resources gained
2 Note that RSA timings for one signature operation vary between 0.15 ms and 8 ms on a PC
depending on the processor (cf. http://bench.cr.yp.to/results-sign.html). In order to obtain ac-
celeration over common PCs, a larger FPGA device that can accommodate more than one
instance of crypto unit should be used. Otherwise, many FPGA boards will be needed to out-
perform PC implementations.
3 Because of large resource consumptions some hardware designs cannot co-exist with the soft-
core (e.g. RSA).
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by removing the softcore can try out an extra 200 million key candidates. This value
commensurates with the number of AES instances that can fit in the space saved through
removing the softcore. Since the communication between the cluster head and FPGA
device is not intense (in fact only the key interval is needed to be communicated to
the FPGA), overlapping communication and computation would not help. Therefore, in
such cases it is always beneficial to apply the configuration switch.
5 Implementation and Experimental Results
In this section, we provide some implementation details and experimental results to
evaluate the true potential of the proposed FPGA cluster for cryptologic computa-
tions. We start with the resources needed to implement the softcore in Spartan-3E
(XC3S500E) device, which consumes 4,270 out of 9,312 (45%) 4-input LUTs and oc-
cupies 3,526 out of 4,656 (75%) slices. The utilization percentage for such a small
FPGA device is relatively high and leaving limited configurable FPGA resources for
hardware unit that will perform the actual computation. This is, in fact, one of the
primary motivation for the scheme that will allow an efficient configuration switch be-
tween the softcore and the hardware unit.
In our experiments, we used a Linux-based PC (cluster head) and ASUS RT-N13U
router in addition to three Spartan-3E Starter Kit boards. We used Verilog for all hard-
ware designs and C/C++ language for software components on the softcore and the
cluster head. The first experiment is intended to find out the efficiency of using the
FPGA boards mainly for cryptographic acceleration if the hardware unit and the soft-
core cannot co-exist in the FPGA board and therefore, configuration switch is necessary.
The experiment is performed as follows: the cluster head sends input values (e.g. mes-
sages to be encrypted or signed) to the FPGA device which are written in the parallel
flash thereafter. After the transmission is completed, a configuration switch command
is sent to the FPGA. Since we are interested only in the overhead the whole process
creates, the hardware unit reads the data from the parallel flash first and then writes it
back to it. Without doing anything else, it switches immediately back to the softcore
configuration and the softcore sends the written data back to the cluster head.
The data exchanged between the cluster head and the FPGA are sent in different
packet sizes (i.e. sizes of send/receive buffers in both sides). The timing values obtained
through averaging for the first experiment are enumerated in rows 2-5 of Table 1. Tim-
ing overhead for handling 1 MB of data is about 27.31 s, on average. 1 MB of data, for
example, means 8192 RSA operation (e.g. signature), where the modulus is 1024 bit.
This results in an overhead of 3.33 ms per 1024-bit RSA operation. Considering that the
state-of-the-art implementation of RSA for Spartan-3E in [1] executes the same opera-
tion in about 8 ms, this increases the effective time per RSA operation roughly by 37%
percent, on average. Note that this overhead would be about 0.87 s for 1 KB data size,
which is definitely not an acceptable performance for a cryptographic accelerator. In
summary, our FPGA cluster may be useful in case the configuration switch is necessary
only when we are able to group the input data in large chunks.
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Packet Storage
Size (B) Device 1 KB 10 KB 100 KB 1 MB
256 Parallel Flash 15.74 17.38 32.70 216.81
512 Parallel Flash 14.40 15.50 21.11 102.90
1024 Parallel Flash 13.65 14.33 16.77 72.73
1024(opt.4) Parallel Flash 6.96 7.44 8.79 27.31
1024(opt.4) SDRAM 0.27 0.35 1.06 7.81
Table 1. Timing overhead (in seconds) for different data and packet sizes
In the second experiment, we measured the time to send and receive data of different
sizes when configuration switch is not needed for the scenario where the cryptographic
unit and the softcore fit in the FPGA device. The SDRAM can be used to store the
data since there is no configuration switch that causes the SDRAM to miss refreshment
cycles. The timing values for the second experiment are enumerated in the last row of
Table 1 only for buffer size of 1024 B. As can be observed from the table, using the
SDRAM rather than the parallel flash, decreases the total time by 19.50 s for 1 MB
of data. However, the timing values in the last row should not really be considered as
actual overhead since operations for sending/receiving data and writing/reading to/from
the SDRAM can be overlapped with the actual cryptographic computation.
In the third experiment, we tried to measure the total overhead time when the data
transfer is not intense and configuration switch can be used, which is typical mostly for
cryptanalytic purposes. The cluster head sends a message of 32 B to the softcore, which
contains the task description as well as the input parameters. After the task description
and input parameters are received, two configuration switch operations occur to config-
ure FPGA first with the hardware than with the softcore. We performed all steps except
for the actual computation time of the task to determine the overhead in time. The tim-
ing results for one, two, and three FPGA boards are measured as 7.06 s, 7.09 s, and
7.14 s, respectively. These results show that we can multiply our computational power
with minor overheads in time.
In the next experiment, we performed an exhaustive key search for PRESENT algo-
rithm [11], which is a lightweight block cipher intended for embedded applications. The
results for a single FPGA board are listed in Table 2. The maximum number of encryp-
tion engines that will fit in Spartan-3E is only 13.With configuration switch and com-
munication costs included, we are able to test about 928 million keys in 61.76 s. The last
row enumerates the experimental results when there is no configuration switch and the
softcore and seven encryption engines run concurrently. This experiment demonstrate
the advantage of configuration switch for exhaustive key search applications. Note that
speed optimized, single-threaded C implementation of the PRESENT algorithm (cf.
http://www.lightweightcrypto.org/present/) on a PC with an AMD 3.2 GHz quad-core
processor and 4 GB RAM can try roughly 106 million keys in 62 s, which also demon-
strates that acceleration of PRESENT algorithm is possible.
Finally, we implemented Pollard’s Rho method [9, 10] to compute discrete loga-
rithms in elliptic curves over prime fields of odd characteristics. For elliptic curve arith-
metic we used Huff model to take advantage of the fast explicit formulae for point ad-
4 We optimized the execution times by adding cache to MicroBlaze and performing improve-
ments in the software.
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Area Max/Usable no of keys
Conf. LUT + Slice Freq. (MHz) tried in  60s
Single PRESENT 3% + 3% 187.37/NA NA
13 PRESENT 74% + 99% 65.23/50 928,628,190 in 61.76 s
7 PRESENT + Softcore 83% + 99% 53.709/50 510,656,511 in 60.10 s
Table 2. Experimental results for exhaustive key search
no of FPGA boards no of runs avg. med. max. min. stdev
3 (Spartan-3E500)5 36 927 849 2368 232 531
7 (Spartan-3E500)5 27 478 442 1074 223 216
5 (Spartan-3E500)+2(Spartan-3E1600)6 30 302 236 687 192 123
Table 3. Timing statistics (in seconds) for Pollard Rho’s alg. on different number of FPGA boards
ditions on Huff curves [12]. The FPGA boards are used to find the distinguished points,
which constitutes the most time-consuming part of the computation in Pollard’s Rho
method. Since a similar approach to the one in [4] is adopted, we only implemented
point addition. The hardware implementation of the circuit to find the distinguished
points (i.e. distinguished points-generating engine) consumes 50% of the total LUTs,
19% of slice flip-flops, and 5% of the block RAMs. In the experiments, we used an el-
liptic curve over a prime field where the prime is a 160-bit integer. The base point order
is chosen as a 50-bit integer to demonstrate that the discrete logarithm can be computed
within a reasonable amount of time using several FPGA boards. A single-threaded PC
implementation on an AMD 3.2 GHz quad-core processor with 4 GB RAM completes
the same task in about 6 minutes, on average, using NTL package [13].
In order to demonstrate that the time performance of the attack improves linearly
with the number of FPGA boards (and the total number of distinguished point-generating
engines), we conducted several experiments. Firstly, we optimized the distinguished
point-generating engine to fit two instances of it in one FPGA device. Secondly, we
employed different number of FPGA boards in our experiments. Using the same curve
and the base point mentioned above, we solved different number of elliptic curve dis-
crete logarithm problems (cf. the second column of Table 3) and enumerated the timing
statistics in Table 3. As can be observed from the table, we can solve one elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem in about 5.03 minutes using seven FPGA boards (i.e. 22 in-
stances of distinguished point-generating engine), on average and also outperform the
PC based implementation7.
6 Conclusion
The experiments demonstrate that the proposed FPGA cluster can be useful for both
cryptographic acceleration and implementing cryptanalytic attacks. Dynamic configu-
ration switch between the soft processor core and the hardware unit, proposed as among
the foremost contributions of this work, proves to be useful especially in exhaustive
search applications in cryptanalysis, where the need for interprocess communication is
5 In these experiments, we performed the attack using three and seven boards of Spartan-3E500,
each of which can fit two instances of distinguished points-generating engine.
6 In this experiment, we performed the attack using two Spartan-3E1600, which can fit six in-
stances of distinguished points-generating engine, along with five boards of Spartan-3E500.
7 We used Asus GIGAX1008B 8 Port 10/100 Layer2 Switch to connect seven FGPA boards.
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very limited (if not absent). Dynamic configuration switch can be useful even for more
powerful FPGA devices since FPGA resources salvaged from the softcore can be put
into effective use.
The proposed FPGA cluster offers advantages over PC-based implementations, when
a single FPGA device can accommodate as many instances of the main computation
unit as possible to take advantage of the parallelism the hardware implementations
offer. While exhaustive search for simple algorithms such as PRESENT can be sub-
stantially accelerated, relatively heavy-weight algorithms such as RSA does not benefit
from the cluster if only one instance of RSA circuit is implemented in one FPGA de-
vice. For acceleration of heavy-weight algorithms, either more advanced FPGA devices
or a multitude of simple FPGA devices should be used. Naturally, price performance
analysis of the FPGA cluster must be performed on the basis of the specific operation
we are trying to accelerate.
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